Jiglu: Farmtalking: Discussion: RE: Regionalization of Epidemic Diseases

Originally from: Pat Gardiner

That's the whole point. The US did not have the information. They were lied to by the British Government in the shape of Maff and later Defra.

Like everyone else they were conned. The State Veterinary Service, who it seems could not tell CSF from PDNS, were faking everything in sight and threatening anyone who stood in their way. What the US embassy needs to do is to go to the House of Lords and excercise their rights to examine the evidence to the Agriculture Select Committee in December 2000. There they will find a submission by George Patrick Gardiner. (not printed to save printing costs – one A4 page)

Then they need to ask a simple question. "What was done about this?"

They can check on the witness through their own Pentagon files...former United States Line agent (1972) and Sealift Military Command agent (MSTMS) – (1968)also stopped embargoed nuclear missile targeting computer from reaching Bulgaria during the Cold War. (1987) This was US equipment that the Bulgarian Communist regime were trying to buy in Britain and ship out via Felixstowe.

Here is the reference to check and arrange inspection: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmagric/32/3208.htm

Yep folks, I'm the real thing – and I caught the bad guys red handed.....Britain's infamous State Veterinary Service.....and did something about it.

Red faces in Washington's Agriculture Department I think.

Sorry about that Mike!!! But in fairness it was Dr. Meredith that originally told the world that the two diseases were easily confused (go check his site)

The truth will out in the end.

Regards Pat Gardiner

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Author wrote:
Swine Fever
snip< We already had extensive information about the region, including information on the authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization of the region; the extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity for such movements; livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region; the type and extent of disease surveillance conducted in the region; diagnostic laboratory capabilities in the region; and the region's policies and infrastructure for animal disease control, i.e., the region's emergency response capacity.